A simple extension of the propositional temporal logic of linear time is proposed. The extension consists of strengthening the until operator by indexing it with the regular programs of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). It is shown that DLTL, the resulting logic, is expressively equivalent to S1S, the monadic second-order theory of !-sequences. In fact a sublogic of DLTL which corresponds to propositional dynamic logic with a linear time semantics is already as expressive as S1S. We pin down in an obvious manner the sublogic of DLTL which correponds to the rst order fragment of S1S. We show that DLTL has an exponential time decision procedure. We also obtain an axiomatization of DLTL. Finally, we point to some natural extensions of the approach presented here for bringing together propositional dynamic and temporal logics in a linear time setting.
Introduction
We present here a simple extension of the propositional temporal logic of linear time (LTL). The basic idea is to strengthen the until modality by indexing it with the regular programs of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). The resulting logic, called dynamic linear time temporal logic (DLTL), is easy to handle. It has the full expressive power of the monadic second order theory of !-sequences (S1S). Indeed a sublogic of DLTL is already equal in expressive power to S1S. A pleasant feature of this sublogic is that it is just PDL operating in a linear time framework.
In addition to our expressiveness results we show that DLTL has an exponential time decision procedure. We also extend the well known axiomatization of PDL 9 ] to obtain an axiomatization of DLTL.
Our work may be viewed from two di erent perspectives. The rst one is from the standpoint of process logics 6, 14, 16] which attempt a rapprochement between dynamic and temporal logics. However the study of process logics is committed to viewing dynamic logic as a restricted kind of a branching time temporal logic. One then attempts to bring in some additional mechanisms for talking about the computational paths of a Kripke frame in a more sophisticated fashion. Our point of departure from this line of work consists of merging, in a very simple way, dynamic logic and temporal logic in a linear time setting.
The second perspective from which our work may be viewed has to do with attempts to augment the limited expressive power of LTL. One route consists of permitting quanti cation over atomic propositions. The resulting logic called QPTL 18] has the expressive power of S1S and has a decision procedure of non-elementary complexity. The second route consists of augmenting LTL with the so called automaton connectives. Indeed this additional feature is so powerful that the next and until modalities become derived ones. The resulting logic called ETL 23] is equal in expressive power to S1S while admitting an exponential time decision procedure. To be precise, the version of ETL we have in mind is the one referred to as ETL f in 21] but for convenience we will call it just ETL here.
Our logic is, in spirit, inspired by ETL and in fact it may appear to be at rst sight just a reformulation of ETL with some cosmetic changes. This however has to do with the instinctive identi cation one makes between nite state automata and regular expressions. In fact DLTL is quite di erent in terms of the mechanisms it o ers for structuring formulas and we feel that it is more transparent and easier to work with. The 2 results and the proofs we present here are designed to support this claim. Our approach also leads to smooth generalizations in non-sequential settings where similar extensions in terms of ETL will be hard to cope with at least in terms of transparency.
In the next section we start with an action-based version of LTL in order to x terminology and to introduce a key feature of DLTL. In Section 3 we present DLTL and its semantics. This is then followed by a more detailed assessment of the similarities and the di erences between ETL and DLTL.
In Section 4 we prove the decidability of DLTL by reducing it to the emptiness problem for B uchi automata. In Section 5 we show that DLTL ? , a sublogic of DLTL, has the same expressive power as S1S. This then easily leads to the conclusion that DLTL, DLTL ? and S1S are all equal in expressive power. We then establish similar results for the rstorder fragment of S1S with the help of the \star-free" fragments of DLTL and DLTL ? .
In Section 6, we extend the axiomatization of PDL and the completeness proof in 9] to obtain nitary axiomatizations of DLTL and DLTL ? . In the nal section we point to two natural generalizations in the setting of distributed systems. These generalizations appear to be eminently accessible and o er additional support to our belief that the synthesis of dynamic and temporal logics in a linear time framework as pursued here is a fruitful one.
Linear Time Temporal Logic
One key feature of the syntax and semantics of our temporal logic is the treatment of actions as rst class objects.
The usual treatment of LTL 10, 15] is based on states viewed as subsets of a nite set of atomic propositions. We wish to bring in actions explicitly for a number of reasons. Firstly, in a state-based approach there is a mismatch between the models of a formula and the language accepted by the associated !-automaton. A model will consist of a sequence of states whereas the automaton will accept or reject a sequence of actions. Thus the alphabet of the automaton will correspond to the possible states of the model. However this is not a major hurdle and it leads, at worst, to minor technical overheads. The more important point is that it is di cult to de ne synchronized products of sequential components in a purely state-based setting. Since this is a very common and useful method of specifying distributed behaviours, we feel that it is handy to work with logics in which both states and actions can be treated on an equal footing.
As a vehicle for introducing some terminology and for later comparisons we shall rst introduce an action-based version of LTL denoted LTL( ). We begin with some notations.
Through the rest of the paper we x a nite non-empty alphabet . We let a; b range over and refer to members of as actions. is the set of nite words and ! is the set of in nite words generated by with ! = f0;1;:::g. We set 1 = ! and denote the null word by ". We let ; 0 range over ! and ; 0 ; 00 range over . Finally is the usual pre x ordering de ned over and for u 2 1 , we let prf(u) be the set of nite pre xes of u.
Next we x a countable set of atomic propositions P = fp 1 ; p 2 ; : : :g and let p; q range over P. The set of formulas of LTL( ) is then given by the syntax: LTL( ) ::= p j j _ j hai j U :
Through the rest of this section ; will range over LTL( ). The modality hai is an action-indexed version of the next state modality of LTL as we shall soon see.
A model of LTL( ) is a pair M = ( ; V ) where 2 ! and V : prf( ) ?! 2 P is a valuation function. Let M = ( ; V ) be a model, 2 prf( ) and be a formula. Then M; j = will stand for being satis ed at in M. This notion is de ned inductively in the expected manner.
M; j = p i p 2 V ( ). M; j = i M; 6 j = . M; j = _ i M; j = or M; j = . M; j = hai i a 2 prf( ) and M; a j = . M; j = U i there exists 0 such that 0 2 prf( ) and M; 0 j = . Moreover for every 00 such that " 00 0 , it is the case that M; 00 j = .
For further reference we note that the next-state modality of LTL is Again we x a countable set of atomic propositions P = fp 1 ; p 2 ; : : :g and let p; q range over P. Then the set of formulas of DLTL( ) is given by the following syntax. DLTL( ) ::= p j j _ j U :
Here and throughout the rest of the paper we take ; to range over DLTL( ). The notion of a model is as in the case of LTL( ). So let M = ( ; V ) be a model, 2 prf( ) and 2 DLTL( ). Then M; j = is de ned inductively. M; j = p i p 2 V ( ).
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M; j = i M; 6 j = . M; j = _ i M; j = or M; j = . M; j = U i there exists 0 2 jj jj such that 0 2 prf( ) and M; 0 j = . Moreover, for every 00 such that " 00 0 , it is the case that M; 00 j = .
Thus DLTL( ) is obtained form LTL( ) by strengthening the until operator. To satisfy U , one must satisfy U along some nite stretch of behaviour which is in the (linear time) behaviour of the program .
As usual, 2 DLTL( ) is satis able i there exist a model M = ( ; V ) and 2 prf( ) such that M; j = . The satis ability problem is, given , to decide whether is satis able.
Apart from the conventional derived propositional connectives such as^; and the derived modality h i and its dual ] will play an important role in the sequel. Note that a 2 is a member of Prg( ) and hence hai is a derived modality. It is also easy to see that the until operator of LTL( ) can be obtained via: U () U . Thus LTL( ) is a fragment of DLTL( ). To see that DLTL( ) is strictly more expressive than LTL( ), let = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : :; a n g and ev = ((a 1 +a 2 +: : :+a n ); (a 1 +a 2 +: : :+a n )) .
It is now easy to see that ev = ev ]p is a speci cation of the property "p holds at every even position".
We shall close out the section by brie y discussing the key di erences between DLTL( ) and ETL, the extension of LTL proposed by Wolper 22] . As mentioned earlier, the version of ETL we shall consider here is the one called ETL f in 21] . We shall present a simpli ed 6 form of ETL so as to stay close to DLTL. First we x an enumeration of = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : :; a n g. The Though the technical details are somewhat di erent, ETL( ) captures the spirit of the logic presented in 21]. The key drawback of ETL( ), as we see it, lies in its lack of structuring principles for forming compound formulas. Stated di erently, the only mechanism that ETL( ) has | apart from the boolean connectives | to form compound formulas is by nesting the automaton formulas. Thus a typical compound formula would look like:
A 1 ( 1 0 ; A 2 ( 2 0 ; 2 1 ; A 3 ( 3 0 ; : : :; 3 n ); 2 3 ; : : :; 2 n ); 1 2 ; : : :; 1 n ):
In contrast, DLTL( ) adds to the familiar mechanisms of LTL an orthogonal and well-understood component; namely, the language of regular expressions. Equally important, this orthogonal component is formulated purely in terms of and not in terms of arbitrary formulas as is the case of ETL. In fact, ETL, as formulated in 21] has an uncontrolled amount of \external" elements in the sense that the states and the alphabets of the automata which are used to write down the automaton formulas have little to do with the logic under consideration.
A Decision Procedure for DLTL
The goal here is to show that the satis ability problem for DLTL( ) can be solved in deterministic exponential time. This will be achieved by e ectively constructing for each 2 DLTL( ), a B uchi automaton B such that the language of !-words accepted by B is non-empty i is satis able.
We shall use the terminology adopted in 20] for dealing with B uchi automata. In particular, a B uchi automaton over is a tuple B = (Q; ?!;Q in ; F) where:
Q is a nite non-empty set of states.
?! Q Q is a transition relation. Q in Q is a set of initial states. F Q is a set of accepting states. 
In what follows will be identi ed with . Moreover, until the end of the section, all the formulas that we encounter | unless stated otherwise | will be assumed to be members of CL( 0 ). For convenience, we shall often write CL instead of CL( 0 ).
A CL is called an atom i it is a subset of CL satisfying: AT ( 0 ) is the set of atoms and again we shall often write AT instead of AT( 0 ). Next we de ne Req( 0 ), the set of until requirements of 0 , to be the subset of CL given by:
We shall write Req instead Req( 0 ) and take ; 0 to range over Req. We shall prove the following intermediate result.
Claim: For all 2 prf( ) and 2 CL; M; j = i 2 A :
First note that if the claim is true then Lemma 4.1 follows at once. This is so because is a run of B and hence (") 2 S in . But from (3) (in the de nition of B), it follows that 0 2 A " . Thus M; " j = 0 and 0 is satis able.
In proving the claim we will repeatedly refer to various clauses in the de nition of the B uchi automaton B.
We proceed by structural induction on . For the base case and the boolean connectives the claim is obvious. Hence assume that = U . Suppose that M; j = U . Since M; j = U there exists 0 2 jj jj such that 0 2 prf( ) and M; 0 j = . Moreover, M; 00 j = for every 00 2 such that " 00 0 .
Suppose 0 = ". Then " 2 jj jj and M; j = . By the induction hypothesis 2 A . From the de nition of an atom it follows that U 2 A . So assume that 0 6 = ". Let = U and R be an accepting run of A over 0 = a 1 a 2 : : :a n with R(") = q 0 2 I and R(a 1 a 2 : : :a i ) = q i for 1 i n and q n 2 F . Since M; 0 j = we have from the induction hypothesis that 2 A 0. Hence by (1.i), F X 0. Now by the de nition of R we are assured that q n?1 an ?! q n . On the other hand, the fact that M; j = U and the choice of 0 guarantee that M; a 1 : : :a n?1 j = (with the convention that " = a 1 : : :a n?1 in case n = 1). By the induction hypothesis 2 A a 1 :::a n?1 , so by (2.i) and the fact that q n 2 X a 1 :::an , we have that q n?1 2 X a 1 :::a n?1 . In case n 2 we repeat the above argument at q n?1 to conclude that q n?2 2 X a 1 :::a n?2 . Continuing this way we can nally arrive at q 0 2 X and 2 A . But q 0 2 I and hence by (1.ii) we are assured that U 2 A .
For the converse direction assume that U 2 A . The are four cases to consider depending on the values of x and f . We will only prove the rst case. The remaining cases can be resolved by very similar arguments.
So assume that x = 0 and f = #. Suppose rst that 2 A and " 2 jj jj. Then by the induction hypothesis M; j = and hence we at once have M; j = U . So assume that 6 2 A or " 6 2 jj jj. . Finally, we will also be assured that (q n ; 1) 2 b X 1 . Now suppose q n 2 F and 2 A 1 . Then 1 2 jj jj and M; 1 j = by the induction hypothesis. Consequently M; j = U . So assume that q n 6 2 F or 6 2 A 1 . Then 2 A 1 (by (1.iv)) and hence M; 1 j = by the induction hypothesis. Now by the choice of 1 , we know that To de ne the remaining three components we will rst de ne the fourth and fth components by mutual induction. To this end we shall make use of some terminology.
We shall call the pair ( ; ) an obligation in M if 2 prf( ) and = U 2 Req such that M; j = U but M; 6 j = or " 6 2 jj jj. If ( ; ; 0 ; R 0 ), ( ; ; 00 ; R 00 ) 2 CH then ( 0 ; R 0 ) = ( 00 ; R 00 ).
It is easy to check that CH exists. (In fact it can be chosen in a canonical manner by xing a lexicographic order on Q for each 2 Req).
With these de nitions in place, we are now prepared to de ne the fourth and the fth components of by induction on . For the base case, we set (x " ; f " ) = (0; X). Now consider the induction step where = 0 a and assume that (x 0; f 0) is de ned for every 0 Otherwise, f = X and x = x 0 .
Finally, the third component of can now be de ned. Q, x 2 f0;1g and f 2 f#;Xg. We will show that ( ) satis es all the clauses of the de nition of B.
So x some U = . Assume initially that 2 A and q 2 F . Then M; j = by de nition of A . Now consider the pair ( 0 ; R 0 ) where 0 = " and R 0 (") = q. From the de nition of X it now follows that q 2 X . Thus F X as required by (1.i).
Next assume that 2 A and q 2 X for some q 2 I . From the de nition of X it follows that there exists a pair ( 0 ; R 0 ) such that 0 2 prf( ) and M; 0 j = and M; 00 j = for every 00 such that " 00 0 . Furthermore, R 0 : prf( 0 ) ?! Q such that R 0 (") = q and R 0 ( 0 ) 2 F and R 0 ( 00 ) a ?! R 0 ( 00 a) for every 00 a 2 prf( 0 ). But from the assumption that q 2 I we have that 0 2 jj jj, because R 0 is an accepting run of A over 0 . Consequently M; j = U and this leads to the conclusion that U 2 A as required by (1.ii).
Next assume that U 2 A and 6 2 A or " 6 2 jj jj. ?! R 0 ( 00 b) for every 00 b 2 prf( 0 ). Furthermore, M; a 0 j = and M; a 00 j = for every 00 such that " 00 0 . Now consider the pair (a 0 ; R 0 a ) where R 0 a : prf(a 0 ) ?! Q is given as R 0 a (") = q and for every 00 2 prf( 0 ), R 0 a (a 00 ) = R 0 ( 00 ). From M; j = (as 2 A by assumption) it now follows at once that q 2 X as required by (2.i).
Suppose now that q 2 Q and (q; z) 2 b X but q 6 2 F or 6 by the de nition of it follows that (x a ; f a ) = (x ; #) as required by (2.iii). On the other hand, if such a (q; z) 2 b X does not exist, then it follows directly from the de nition that (x a ; f a ) = (x ; X) as required by (2.iii).
We have now veri ed that is a run of B over . To show that is accepting it su ces to prove that for any 2 prf( ) there exists 0 such that 0 2 prf( ) and f 0 = X.
Case 1: (x ; f ) = (0; X). By picking 0 = " the desired conclusion follows trivially. . Let a 2 prf( ). Then it is easy to see that (x a ; f a ) = (0; #). But it is also easy to verify ? a = ; or k a < k . Proceeding in this way the required conclusion can be drawn eventually.
The two other cases can be resolved by similar arguments.
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It is now straightforward to establish the main result of this section.
To start with we de ne the size of a formula , denoted j j, via: jpj = 1, j j = 1 + j j and j _ j = 1 + j j + j j. j U j = 1 + j j + j j + j j, where j j is given by jaj = 1, j + 0 j = j ; 0 j = 1 + j j + j 0 j and j j = 1 + j j. 
As usual, the decision procedure can be applied to solve the associated model checking problem but we will not enter into details here.
Some Expressiveness Results
Our main goal here is to show that DLTL( ) has the same expressive power as the monadic second-order theory of in nite sequences over . Towards the end of the section we will also establish that a natural sublogic of DLTL( ) captures the rst order theory of in nite sequences over .
In order to obtain clean formulations of the expressiveness results, we shall banish atomic propositions through the rest of the paper. Instead, we will just work with the constant > and its negation > () ?. To be precise, the syntax of DLTL( ) will be from now on assumed to be: DLTL( ) ::= > j j _ j U ; where 2 Prg( ) with Prg( ) de ned as before.
A model is now just a !-sequence 2 ! . For 2 prf( ) we de ne ; j = via:
; j = >.
All the other clauses are lled in exactly as in Section 3 while replacing M by in the appropriate places. Each formula now de nes a !-language L ! given by:
We say that L ! is DLTL( )-de nable i there exists some 2
The monadic second-order theory of in nite sequences over is denoted S1S( ). Its vocabulary consists of a family of unary predicates fR a g a2 , one for each a 2 ; a binary predicate ; a binary predicate "; a countable supply of individual variables Var = fx;y;z;:::g; a countable supply of set variables (i.e. monadic predicate variables) SVar = fX;Y;Z;:::g. The formulas of S1S( ) are then built up by: R a (x), x y and x 2 X are atomic formulas. If and 0 are formulas then so are , _ 0 , (9x) and (9X) . A structure for S1S( ) is a !-sequence 2 ! . Let I be an interpretation of the variables with I : Var ?! ! and I : SVar ?! 2 ! . Then the notion of being a model of under the interpretation I, denoted j = I , is de ned in the expected manner. In particular, j = I R a (x) i (I(x)) = a (note that 2 ! is here to be viewed as : ! ?! ); j = I x y i I(x) I(y) (here is the usual ordering over !); j = I x 2 X i I(x) 2 I(X).
As usual, a sentence is a formula with no free variables. Each sentence de nes a !-language denoted L where:
We say that L ! is S1S( )-de nable i there exists a sentence 2
Proof: Consider the construction from the previous section which associates a B uchi automaton B 0 with each formula 0 2 DLTL( ). Suppose we apply this construction to formulas arising from the restricted syntax assumed in the present section. Then it is easy to see that, in the ab- It is easy to see that each L q;q 0 is a regular subset of . Hence we can x a regular expression q;q 0 2 Prg( ) such that L q;q 0 = jj q;q 0jj. Due to the determinacy of A it follows at once that if q; q 0 ; q 00 2 Q such that L q;q 0 \ L q;q 00 6 = ; then q 0 = q 00 . Now let F = fq 0 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q n?1 g with n 1. Then the formula F is given by: Clearly A 2 DLTL ? ( ). We wish to argue that L(A) = L A . So rst suppose that 2 L(A). Let : prf( ) ?! Q be the (unique) run of A over . We must have inf( ) 2 F since is an accepting run. Assume that inf( ) = F = fq 0 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q n?1 g with n 1. There must exist a 2 prf( ) such that ( ) = q 2 F and for all 0 2 , 0 2 prf( ) implies ( 0 ) 2 F. This is so because inf( ) = F. If ( ) = q then 2 jj q in ;q jj because (") = q in and (consequently) being a run assures us that q in ?! q. Now suppose ; j = h q;q 0i> for some q 0 6 2 F. Then there exists 0 2 jj q;q 0jj such that 0 2 prf( ). But this violates the assumed property of . Consequently, for every q 0 6 2 F we must have ; j = q;q 0]?. Hence ; j = V q 0 6 2F q;q 0]?.
Next suppose j 2 f0;1;:::;n ? 1g and 0 2 jj q;q j jj such that 0 2 prf( ). Then by the assumed property of there must exist 00 6 = " such that 0 00 2 prf( ) and ( 0 00 ) = q j 1 , because q j 1 2 F = inf( ). Clearly 00 2 jj q j ;q j 1 jj because ( 0 ) = q j . Thus ; j = q;q j ]h q j ;q j 1 i> for every j 2 f0;1;:::;n ? 1g. We have now established that ; " j = F where F 2 F. This in turn implies that ; " j = A and hence 2 L A . Now assume that ; " j = A . Then it must be the case that ; " j = F for some F 2 F with F = fq 0 ; q 1 ; : : :; q n?1 g, n 1. Consequently, there exist 2 prf( ) and q 2 F such that 2 jj q in ;q jj and ; j =q To see that the claim holds, let 0 2 prf( ) and ( 0 ) = q 0 . If q 0 6 2 F then 0 2 jj q;q 0jj would lead to the contradiction that ; j = h q;q 0i> for some q 0 6 2 F. Thus the claim holds, which at once implies that inf( ) F.
If we now show that F inf( ) we are done. So let j 2 f0;1;:::;n? 1g. To show that q j 2 inf( ) assume that 0 2 such that 0 2 prf( ).
Let ( 0 ) = q i , say. We must show that there exists 00 such that 0 00 2 prf( ) and ( 0 00 ) = q j .
If i = j then we can set 00 = " and be done. So suppose i 6 = j. Then clearly 0 2 jj q;q i jj. But ; j = q;q i ]h q i ;q i 1 i> and hence there must exist i 2 jj q i ;q i 1 jj such that 0 i 2 prf( ) so that ( 0 i ) = q i 1 . If i 1 = j then we can set 00 = i . Otherwise 0 i 2 jj q;q i 1 jj and hence we can nd i 1 such that 0 i i 1 2 prf( ) such that ( 0 i i 1 ) = q i 2 . If i 2 = j we set 00 = i i 1 , otherwise we proceed as before. Eventually we will be done. At present we do not know of a direct conversion of DLTL( )-formulas into DLTL ? ( )-formulas. Although these two logics have the same expressive power in the sense of Theorem 5.3, it appears that DLTL( ) will admit more natural speci cations. In addition, it is a conservative extension of LTL( ) even from a syntactic standpoint and hence conventional LTL speci cations can be brought in with no overhead translation costs.
We shall conclude this section by pointing out that star-free programs can be used to capture the rst-order de nable subsets of ! . Admittedly this is not a big surprise, but it illustrates once more that our method of augmenting the expressive power of LTL is a natural one.
FO( ) will denote the rst-order theory of !-sequences generated by . It is the fragment of S1S( ) obtained by eliminating set variables from the syntax. We shall say that L ! is FO( )-de nable i there exists a sentence in FO( ) such that L = L .
The set of star-free regular programs over is denoted Prg SF ( ) and its syntax is given by: The last step is to show that DLTL SF ( )-de nability implies FO( )-de nability. The proof will be syntactic and it will be convenient to go through some preliminaries. 
Proof: Follows easily from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7.
6 Axiomatizations
Our axiomatization of the set of valid formulas of DLTL is an extension of Segerberg's axiomatization of PDL 17] . Moreover, our completeness argument is based on the elegant proof of completeness of Segerberg's axioms due to Kozen and Parikh 9] . It will be convenient to rst axiomatize DLTL ? . We begin by augmenting the set of regular programs with the atomic program 1. We set jj1jj = f"g. By abuse of notation this augmented set of programs will also be denoted as Prg( (ii) DLT L is a sound and complete axiomatization of the set of valid formulas of DLTL( ).
Conclusion
We have presented here an enriched version of LTL called DLTL. The extension is obtained by indexing the until operator of LTL with regular programs. We have shown that in terms of the complexity of the decision procedure and expressiveness, DLTL compares very favourably with ETL. It is worth pointing out here that the decision procedure for DLTL is carried out directly in terms of B uchi automata whereas for ETL it is carried out in terms of the so called set-subword automata, which are then translated to B uchi automata 21]. Two additional results that are available for DLTL are: A characterization of the rst order fragment of S1S in terms of the sublogics DLTL ? SF and DLTL SF ; and a relatively clean axiomatization of DLTL ? and DLTL. All these results demonstrate that our means of bringing together propositional dynamic and temporal logics in a linear time setting is natural.
It turns out that our idea extends smoothly to richer domains. In particular, we can obtain similar results concerning the so called !-regular being an irre exive and symmetric independence relation. Here by traces we mean the class of -labelled posets known as Mazurkiewicz traces. These objects play a fundamental role in the theory of distributed systems 2, 11]. It turns out that !-regular trace languages can be captured by a natural extension of DLTL( ) denoted DLTL( ; I). The main idea is that one must use regular \parallel" programs instead of regular programs to index the until operator. What is interesting about this characterization is that so far there has been no comparable result concerning !-regular trace languages in terms of a modal logic with a xed point operator or in terms of a linear time temporal logic. These results and related generalizations will be reported in a forthcoming paper.
